This post is due by Tuesday, April 15 @ midnight for full credit.
Email late posts to rwilliamsATchamplain.edu for partial credit.
Read the assigned chapters above, and then:
1. Provide 3 SPECIFIC observations about the Arab Spring you learned from EACH chapter of our book, using 2-3 sentences combining the book and your own IYOW analysis.
2. Finally, ask ONE specific question you have of the Arab Spring after completing our reading.
Chapter 10
ReplyDelete1. Protests broke out not just in Bahrain but in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. They were largely peaceful and their participants were unarmed (248). I wonder why these protests did not turn violent like so many other countries in the Arab world.
2. Saudi Arabia sought to ensure that the new forces emerging from the uprisings did not pose a threat to their own domestic grip on power. Riyadh in particular must fear a future scenario whereby a major domestic uprising requires such brutal repression by the security forces (257). If a serious uprising does occur in Saudi Arabia I would be curious to see what role the United States plays considering our need for Saudi Arabia’s resources.
3. With the new generation more exposed to and often educated in the West and wired into the Twittersphere, there will be greater bottom-up pressure for political participation (261). The monarchies in the gulf will probably only consider top-bottom reformation instead of bottom-up reformation because of fear that they might lose too much power.
Chapter 11
1. Faced with the practicalities of governing day to day, Islamist groups will need to make tough decisions and will no longer be able to hide behind the abstract ideals of Islamic rule (267). These groups will have to make compromises in order to make progress in parliamentary politics.
2. Islamist parties offered voters a strong vision of a just society. Islam seeks to provide not just spiritual guidance but an entire design for life, leading to the Muslim Brotherhood’s rallying cry of ‘Islam is the Solution’ (272). It seems that the Brotherhood is unclear on how they will try and achieve their goals.
3. It is unrealistic to expect Arab countries to establish in a single year the separation of politics and religion that took centuries in Europe. A new political system can be installed in a short time, but social customs and prejudices are often much slower to change (280). The United States has come a long way since its independence, but it has been centuries, so it is difficult to judge when abundant progress towards democracy is seen in Arab countries.
Question: If Islamists have many different viewpoints, how are they supposed to agree on one main vision for the future?
CH 10
ReplyDelete1. The concept of absolute monarchies is an increasingly slimming in the 21st century, with very few existing outside the Arab World, and those existing in the Arab world are very newly formed, mostly within the last hundred years. The 8 emirates in Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have survived 2011, but things have greatly changed for their countries (Warren 247).
2. The country of Oman must prepare for the upcoming post-oil era; by the 2020s Oman is expected to have drained their oil fields, which is a major income for the country. This problem has been postponed due to high energy prices and better than expected production but the problem is still at hand and eventually will force Oman to face their future without oil as a commodity (Warren 251).
3. Lines of succession, and the credibility of future monarchs, will also be crucial. Monarchies that try to guarantee their success through shifting toward a constitutional monarchy will face resistance from those that stand to lose in this change. Some monarchs will try to draw along their heritage for credibility. The king of Jordan might try to draw upon his Hashemite lineage, which traces itself back to the family of the prophet Mohamed, monarchs, will claim to anything they can to keep a sense of legitimacy keeping their followers (Warren 260).
Ch 11
1. The term ‘Islamist’ is often misunderstood and be can misleading. The term incorporates such wide variety of views; Islamists view Islam as a framework for political and social action and rule, not just personal conduct or spiritual belief. Islamists use religion to achieve political goals, but those goals can differ as significantly as the tactics used to persue them. Islamists are not only those who espouse the violent overthrows of governments, but also those who accept the rotation of power within the border of individual states (Warren 266).
2. Islam views the umma as the community of believers, which may include people of different nationalities but excludes people of different religions. Like most major religions, Islam predates the relatively recent creation of the nation state and for those who wish to create and idealized Islamic community; it is not always easy to relinquish aspects of their religious tradition for the sake of creating a coherent national identity (Warren 279).
3. The Islamists are the most powerful electoral force in the Arab world, but they are far from along in holding a presence. Governments must also consider how regulations which are passed, such as banning alcohol, will impact on jobs in the crucial tourism sector, poor management of economy and declining living standards does not tend to win votes for any party, religious or not (warren 274).
Question: What was going through the minds of the monarch’s right before they were thrown out of power? What are you thinking about as you finally realize in your head, its finally over, I’m no longer in control.
Chapter 10
ReplyDelete1. “Inspired by the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings and the wave of change that appeared to be spreading across the region, youths and intellectuals began to air their demands. Protest broke out not Justin Bahrain but in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and even Saudi Arabia” (246) They were mild in intensity and participant were largely unarmed. This was likely due to the fact that there was no sense of urgency like there was with the violent protests.
2. Saudi Arabia may be unwilling to empower the Shi’ites in Bahrain because of its wider cold war with Iran; meaningful reform in Jordan is linked to the fate of the Palestinians; and no one, from Washington to Beijing, wants to see uncontrolled unrest in the world’s biggest oil-exporting region that could further batter the fragile global economy. ” (254) I feel this sentence pretty much sums up the politics in the area.
3.”The GCC possesses the collective financial strength to appease its own populations and, if necessary, fund Morocco and Jorden to do the same. Any youth or Shi’ite-led uprising in Saudi Arabia will likely be met with a potent combination of religious decrees, suppression and money.” (259). It is unfortunate that these powers will be able to hold such a tight grip on their monarchies even if they face opposition.
Chapter 11
1. “The very term ‘Islamist’ incorporates such a wide variety of views that it can often be misleading.” (264) This term encompasses many different people and a wide range of tactics used to accomplish goals. It is not strictly violent tactics.
2. “It is easy, while in opposition, to call for measures like the banning of alcohol, for instance. In government, however, an Islamist party in Egypt or Tunisia must also consider the impact on jobs in the crucial tourism sector.”(272) This concept is extremely interesting, in American politics, opposition usually come from another party not from the organization itself.
3. “But to say that 2011 was a defeat for Al-Qaeda is to miss the point, and overstate its original appeal. Al-Qaeda’s ideology had always thrived on the fringes of Arab society, and despite its headline-grabbing and deadly attacks, the network always relied on small bands of fanatics that could wreak havoc.”(279)
Question?
Would post-oil cause further uprisings in the oil rich regions of the Middle East?
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteChapter 10: The Kings Dilemma
ReplyDelete1. UAE was at the crossroad between political reforms and conservation. They had a strong economy. They were shocked with the uprising. The ruling families in the UAE nations bought stability. They worked in the interest of the poor. This was to avoid revolution in their nations.
2. Meeting the economic expectations of their citizens would somehow prove crucial if monarchies of Arab were to sap the momentum of any future protest movements and limit political reform depth that ruling families could be forced to implement.
3. Energy wealth provided the for a ruling bargain that was established in which the rules provided for those who were not in power but in return demanded political acquiescence and loyalty.
Chapter 11: The Islamist Resurgence
1. Islam is a tool used to meet the political goals. Goals are different with each group as in the case of Algeria. This makes it change in ideology each time.
2. Islamist government requires weighing options. What the government may feel appropriate may not be good for the electorates. It calls for meeting all interests.
3. The resurgence of Islamist has political and social impacts on the Arabs uprisings. Each group came with its demand. This brought confrontation.
Question?
What had more of an impact on Arab spring Islam or political Islam? Why?
Yalla - fine reflections on THE KINGS DILEMMA, colleagues.
ReplyDeleteShukran,
Dr. W
Chapter 10
ReplyDelete1. “The way these countries manage their oil and gas revenues is still riddled with inefficiencies.” (page 247) The reliance on oil is one thing in these countries but the inability to manage the revenues generated is horrific. As well as the spending patterns being anything but stable.
2. “The other Gulf monarchies face more challenging situations, either because they lack wealth needed to buy political allegiance or, in the case of Kuwait, because a system that seeks hereditary rule with a relatively empowered parliament is beginning to crack.” (page 249) When keeping rule in the same hands for so many years your rule will be very one sided and selfish.
3. “Lacking the cash to offer endless handouts, Jordan’s King Abdullah faces a dilemma.” (page 251) If he allows political involvement by the 6 million people he risks annoying traditional supporters. As a result of his decisions new parties will arise only to oppose.
Chapter 11
1. “In the slums, young men prowled the streets with nothing to do, the unemployed legions produced by one of the fastest growing populations in the world.” (page 261) Senior officials lining their pockets at the peoples expense. This is one of the many fuels of a revolution.
2. The biggest test of islamic government isn’t how they behave when they win but how they behave when they eventually lose. As many islamic groups have their own visions in mind they completely fail to accept the ideas of the Christians and Jews in their countries.
3. “In time, Islamic parties will lose some of their appeal as the most obvious way of rejecting status quo.” (Page 281) As these parties lose popularity it will be interesting to see what other ideas arise and what these countries hold in a future of no religious party influence.
What will happen to these countries as new political parties arise?
DeleteChapter 10
ReplyDelete"In the winter of 2006, the United Arab Emirates was gearing up for its first ever elections. It would be wrong to call them free or universal because, of the 403,000 Emiratis aged twenty or older." (245) I think it's nuts to think back at 2006 when the U.A.E was barely going to have their legit elections for the first time.
"A government survey in 2009 found that the average annual income for an Emirati household in Dubai was $210,400". (246) I couldn't believe that the average annual income would be that high.
"The way these countries manage their oil and gas revenues is still riddled with corruption, inequality, and wastage". (250) It's too bad that countries that have the potential to have their people in a good economic place don't due t corruption.
Chapter 11
"The tragedy that befell Algeria, blessed with hydrocarbon reserves and a diverse, enormous territory that should have made it one of the most prosperous states in Africa". (264) This once again had a lot of potential but because the people that were in power couldn't steer the state in the right direction.
"The young revolutionaries who led the protest movements in 2011 were often associated with neither the Islamist nor the established and discredited secular parties". (273) This means that most people in protest had not religion association, I think that is huge in the Middle East given that religion is a must.
"The Islamist may be the most powerful electoral force in the Arab world of 2012, but they are far from alone. In every country where they have made gains, counterweights to their influence will limit the Islamization of state and society, but could also become dangerous flash points". (274)
If the Arab countries didn't have corruption, where would they be today?
Ch 10
ReplyDelete1. It wasn’t until December 2006 that the United Arab Emirates had their first elections. However, less than 2% had the privilege to vote. They would be electing only half the members of the Federal National Council who advices instead of making policies (243).
2. “Monarchies around the region had long pointed to such troubled Arab experiments with democracy to remind the world and their own nationals of just how good they had it. They could point to how the removal of kings in Egypt, Iraq, Syria or Libya ultimately gave rise to military regimes coated in a veneer of republicanism and iced with leaders like Saddam Hussein, Mummar Gaddafi or Hosni Mubarak who all hoped to create their own dynasties. Political repression, mass jailings and heavy-handed surveillance had failed to protect those men from the upheaval of 2011, providing more evidence for Arab ruling families to argue that their islands of apparent stability, for their restrictions, were preferable to the frothing sea of sectarian strife or military republicanism that surrounded them” (244).
3. Saudi Arabia spent more money during the Arab Spring than any other country. They promised subsidies to their citizens, but also offered financial aid to Oman, Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen. If Saudi Arabia doesn’t take a look at their spending they will face repercussions in their own country, and it can be traced back to the Arab Spring (253).
Ch 11
1. Algeria’s Arab Spring happened in 1988 and not in 2011 when revolutions spread throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa. Reforms were announced, the press was free and political parties were formed (261).
2. “The notion that a win for the Islamist political parties necessarily equals a loss for democracy is false in the context of the Arab Spring. The ultimate fallout from rising Islamist influence is far from predetermined and will differ from country to country, but another Iran or Afghanistan did not, two years on, seem in the making. Indeed, while the Western media has focused on the dangers of Islamists taking power, their twentieth-century experience has left many Arabs more wary of secular rulers trying to monopolize power than of Islamists doing the same.” (263).
3. The liberal youth in Egypt and Morocco called for elections to be delayed or boycotted because they realized that they didn’t have the resources to win against well established religious groups. “While they were not the driving force of the initial uprisings, the subsequent popularity of Islamist parties in the first elections after the Arab Sping should come as no surprise. There are several explanations for their appeal, but none appear to include mass desire to create Taliban states in North Africa, and much of that appeal will be less potent by the time the next round of elections begins.” (269).
Question: Will the monarchies be able to withstand the battle past the Arab Spring when instability plagues every region?
Chapter 10
ReplyDelete1.) “It would be wrong to call them free or universal because, of the 403,000 Emiratis aged twenty or older, less than 2 per cent would be given the privilege of a vote, and all of them would be chosen by the rulers.” (page 245) – that would not go over well in America where some people are very avid voters.
2.) “The sight of Mubarak in a coourtrooom cage and Gaddafi’s rotting cor[se on display to the snap-happy masses offer a fory glimpse of what might await them if revolution occurred.” (page 247) – that is pretty graphic, and would keep me from revolting, probably, but I might follow the masses.
3.) “In Morocco and Jordan, the younger generation of activists are skeptical about GCC membership, fearing that the oil-rich Gulf would hold back a popular desire for change by subsidizing cheap commodities or fudnign thousands of well-paid government jobs. – (page 268) AND ”The GCC possesses the collective financial strength to appease its own populations and, if necessary, fund Morocco and Jorden to do the same. Any youth or Shi’ite-led uprising in Saudi Arabia will likely be met with a potent combination of religious decrees, suppression and money.” (259). – The biggest thing I wanted to take away from this was how it was the youth that saw a potential issue. It was also the youth who saw issues in other countries as well, and the youth who were very active in the uprisings.
Chapter 11
1.) “The very term ‘Islamist’ incorporates such a wide variety of views that it can often be misleading.” (264) – its interesting to read how one would, or a group would use their religion to gain things on a political level.
2.) “But even the Muslim Brotherhood itself embodies a spectrum of opinion…” – (page 268) – This brotherhood was the same one that people didn’t like in one of the films we watched, and here they are split up. Some in favor of political life. They seem normal to me
3.) “In time, Islamic parties will lose some of their appeal as the most obvious way of rejecting status quo.” (Page 281) – It will interesting to see what parties will come about, especially non-religious ones.
Chapter 10
ReplyDelete1.) In the decade before 2011, most Arab ruling families had tweaked their political systems to give the public more say in policymaking. At one end of the spectrum was Morocco, which permitted political parties and held elections for a parliament with limited powers.
2.) The geopolitical concerns discussed in the first section of this book - oil, Israel and Iran - will continue to shape change as Arab monarchies reposition themselves in light of regional turbulence.
3.) In every monarchy there are bigger questions at stake. All had been within the US sphere of influence since the end of the Second World War, whether that meant security or military alliances, importing Western-style economic models, or cooperating in the "war on terror".
Chapter 11
1.) The term ‘Islamist’ is often misunderstood and be can misleading. The term incorporates such wide variety of views; Islamists view Islam as a framework for political and social action and rule, not just personal conduct or spiritual belief. Islamists use religion to achieve political goals, but those goals can differ as significantly as the tactics used to persue them. Islamists are not only those who espouse the violent overthrows of governments, but also those who accept the rotation of power within the border of individual states.
2.) Aside from famous exceptions, such as the tragic trajectory of Germany after the 1932 elections which made the Nazis the largest party in parliament, parties that reach power by the ballot box are more likely to leave by the ballot box. Shi'ite Islamists have played a dominate role in Iraqi politics since the 2003 invasion and while that democracy is far from perfect and rights groups have complained of growing repression, there has been no effort to abrogate elections.
3.) In time, Islamist parties will lose some of their appeal as the most obvious way of rejecting the statue quo. Indeed, we may already have seen the peak of their popularity. But by early 2013, it was not clear what new ideas would compete effectively with them.