Russia, while supporting the regime of Ben Ali handled his ousting rather well, stating that is a lesson for other governments that they need to take precautions, making sure they do not allow something like this to happen. This is exactly how Russia looked at the Syrian Arab Spring, making sure to provide Bashar Al-Assad with the supplies he needs to stay in power, while limiting western intervention. Russia largely remained inactive and uninvolved in the Tunisian Arab spring, but since, has begun to create stronger economic and political ties with the new government. "Russia largely remained a passive spectator. For one thing, this was because there were neither important economic ties nor special political connections with the leaders of the affected countries and thus nothing to defend" (Klein). Russia played a minor role in either preventing or creating the Arab Spring in Tunisia, but the year following the Arab Spring resulted in a large reduction in goods traded between Tunisia and Russia, which was followed by an increase in affairs between the governments.
The Tunisian revolution was very unlike the rest of the Arab Spring, often called "the success story" the revolution in Tunisia resulted in much less bloodshed than other countries such as Egypt or Syria. Though Russia fought against the proposed the No-fly zone over Libya in order to prevent Gaddafi from bringing in mercenaries and using military airplanes and helicopters against civilians, this resistance was out matched, and eventually Russia would side against the regime. On October 20th 2011 Gadaffi was brutally killed by Libyan rebels putting an end to his regime. Russia had a strongly economically tied relationship to the Gadaffi regime, and when it fell Russia lost billions of dollars. "Russia, the world's No. 2 arms exporter, has frequently cited losses of $4 billion in Libyan arms contracts. "The figure of $4 billion is only nominal, the real lost revenue could top tens of billions of dollars," said Mikhail Dmitriyev, the head of Russia's Federal Service on Military and Technical Cooperation" (Anischuk). Throughout the Arab Spring Russia was one of the largest providers for the Gadaffi regimes weapons and military supplies and fully supported Gadaffi until nearly the end. Along with supplying the government with weapons, the oil trade connected Libya and Russia tightly. With Gadaffi out of power this brings worry to the Russian government regarding whether the new regime will give the most favorable contracts to those countries that supported the rebels. Ultimately the lose of support from the Russians was what allowed for the success of removal of Gadaffi.
One of the greatest misunderstandings about the Russian-Syrian relationship throughout this revolution is, Why is the Russian government supporting the revolution and what is the ultimate goal. Western belief is largely that Russia aims to profit from selling arms to Bashar al-Assad and maintain the naval facility at the Syrian port of Tartus. A reported states that the official Russian released reason of the support is that "The real reason Russia is resisting strong international action against the Assad regime is that it fears the spread of Islamic radicalism and the erosion of its superpower status in a world where Western nations are increasingly undertaking unilateral military interventions. Syria is among Russia's significant customers, but it is by no means one of the key buyers of Russian arms, accounting for just 5% in 2011" (Pukhov). While this is a very small number for Russia, the Syrian regime is very dependent on the assistance from the Russian government and without the help from Putin Bashar al-Assad would very unlikely been able to stay in power, which to the West is a negative outcome, but to Russians, a successful intervention. "Crimea is the next Syria" (Bernard), "To Russian and Syrian officials, the Syrian war and the standoff over the Crimean Peninsula are essentially part of a single, larger battle, against post-Cold War American unilateralism. They see themselves as resisting Western conspiracies to topple inconvenient but legitimate presidents" (Bernard). The comparison between these two revolutions shows the concern that Russia has of western intervention and illustrates the reasoning of Russia interventions in both Syria and Crimea. "Speaking of Russia, Libyans should remember that namely thanks to it, Gaddafi was removed from his Olympus. If in March, Moscow did not abstain in the UN Security Council vote, then the colonel would still be in power now" (Chaykovskaya). When Russia backed down from supporting Gadaffi this is when everything began to change. When Russia decided to not abstain in the UN Security Council vote this gave the Western allies to ultimately create victory for the rebels. Once the no-fly zone was set up over the country this weakened the Gadaffi regime and then once the bombings began and with the help of France and Great Britain the rebels were able to overthrow Gadaffi. Unlike the intervention in other Arab Springs the role that Russia played in Libya was aligned with the Western countries, and became one of the most influential steps in the success of the rebels. With the lack of opposition from the Russian government this allowed for a much less repercussion filled intervention from the West, which gave the rebels the needed boost of power to take down Gadaffi, over the course of several months France, Great Britain, and the US gave their military and financial support to the Libyan rebel groups and shut down the Gadaffi regimes ability to bring in military aid resulting in his capture and execution.
"The Russian government, like its counterparts in the West, the Middle East, and elsewhere, was caught off guard by the outburst of Arab uprisings beginning in January 2011 that swept away long-ruling authorial regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and have threatened to topple those in Syria" (Katz). Throughout the Arab Spring the interventions of the Russian government have been inconsistent and have led to skepticism by the West of their intentions, Russia played a very large role in the Arab Spring. Continuously offering support to the Assad regime in Syria the west waits and watches for the true motives of Russia to come out. During the revolts in Tunisia and Libya Russia’s interventions were pivotal in their outcomes, with abstaining from the UN Security council vote regarding Libya this led to the toppling of the Gadaffi regime and success for the rebel groups, and unlike many of the other uprisings, put aligned Russia with the Western worlds strategy for handling the revolution. Though Russian viewpoints often differ from the Western ideas regarding foreign affair interventions much can be learned from how Russia responded to the removal of the Tunisian president. After the quick success in the Tunisian revolution Russia’s president Dmity Medvedev replied "I think what happened in Tunisia was a big lesson for governments all around the world. Governments should not sit on their laurels and settle back in comfy chairs, but need to grow and develop together with society, regardless of where they are: in Europe, Africa, or Latin America" (Katz).
Works Cited
1. "AllAfrica." Russia Willing to Support Tunisia. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.
2. Anishchuk, Alexei. "Gaddafi Fall Cost Russia Tens of Blns in Arms Deals." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 02 Nov. 2011. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.
3.Barnard, Anne. "Russian Defiance Is Seen as a Confidence Builder for Syria’s Government." The
4. New York Times. The New York Times, 21 Mar. 2014. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.
5. "POLITICS." The Moscow News. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.
6. Pukhov, Ruslan. "Why Russia Is Backing Syria." The New York Times. The New York Times, 06 July 2012. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.
7. "Russia and the Arab Spring | Middle East Institute." Russia and the Arab Spring | Middle East Institute. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.
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